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WHEN DOING THE RIGHT THING MEANS
LOSING YOUR JOB:  REFORMING THE
NEW YORK WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTE
Silvia X. Liu*
“Our lives begin to end the day we become silent about things
that matter.”
– Martin Luther King Jr.1
INTRODUCTION
In 2002, investors lost more than $300 billion,2 employees of
the country’s biggest corporations lost their jobs, and millions of
workers saw their retirement funds drained.3  For countless Ameri-
cans, the year is remembered as “the year corporations failed
them.”4  At a time when many were devastated by corporate fraud
and troubled by the ineffectiveness of law enforcement agen-
cies, three women became “heroes at the scene, anointed by cir-
cumstance.”5  Cynthia Cooper, Coleen Rowley, and Sherron Wat-
kins were the proverbial pearly white lilies that blossomed out of
the muddy waters of corporate scandals and government over-
sights6–they were whistleblowers.7
The term “whistleblower” is derived from “the act of an En-
glish bobby [policeman] blowing his whistle upon becoming aware
of the commission of a crime to alert other law enforcement of-
ficers and the public within the zone of danger.”8  Today, the term
* City University of New York School of Law, J.D. candidate, May 2004.  The au-
thor thanks Professor Ruthann Robson for working tirelessly with her on this article,
and Professor Andrea McArdle for her valuable input.  She also thanks her Mom and
Dad for believing in her and allowing her to pursue her dreams.
1 Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year–Coleen Rowley, Cynthia
Cooper, Sherron Watkins, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002/Jan. 6, 2003, at 26.  The quotation was
printed on note pads that Enron handed out to its employees. Id.
2 John A. Byrne, Fall from Grace, BUS. WEEK, Aug. 12, 2002, at 51.
3 Jonathan J. Higuera, Corporate Backlash, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Sept. 22, 2002, at D1.
4 Adi Ignatius, Wall Street’s Top Cop, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002/Jan. 6, 2003, at 64.
5 Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 1, at 26.
6 “The pearly white lilies that blossomed out of muddy water without stain.”  Chi-
nese proverb, learned at mother’s knee.
7 They are also TIME’s Persons of the Year in 2002.  James Kelly, The Year of the
Whistle-Blowers, TIME, Dec. 30 2002/Jan. 6, 2003, at 8.
8 Winters v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett,
J., concurring); see also Joan Corbo, Note, Kraus v. New Rochelle Hosp. Medical Ctr.: Are
Whistleblowers Finally Getting the Protection They Need?, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 141 (1994)
61
62 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:61
has taken on the meaning of “[a]n employee who reports em-
ployer illegality to a governmental or law-enforcement agency.”9
Whistleblowers serve an important function in safeguarding public
welfare by disclosing their employers’ wrongful conduct that the
employers would prefer to conceal.10  They are people who aim to
right the wrongs of their superiors by risking, at the very least, their
jobs, health, privacy and sanity.11  This article focuses on
whistleblowers who are private employees.  Thus, in this article,
“whistleblowers” refer to private employees who disclose their em-
ployers’ wrongful conduct.
Uniquely situated, a whistleblower can detect the presence of
illegality more readily than a governmental inspector can and is
often the only person who can provide information about the em-
ployer’s wrongful conduct.12  For example, Cynthia Cooper, head
of the internal audit department of WorldCom, decided to redo
the company’s financial audits after a WorldCom executive told
her that corporate accounting took money from his reserve ac-
count and used it to boost WorldCom’s income.13  She later discov-
ered that, in 2001, through “creative accounting,” WorldCom
turned a $662 million loss into a $2.4 billion profit.14  She blew the
whistle by informing the audit committee of WorldCom’s board of
her findings.15  Soon after, the public learned that WorldCom had
committed the largest accounting fraud in history by inflating its
profit by $3.8 billion.16  The number grew to $9 billion by Decem-
ber, 2002.17  As of January 2003, Cooper was still assisting both the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Securities and Exchange
Commission in their investigation into WorldCom’s inappropriate
accounting practices by providing data that she had secretly copied
while redoing WorldCom’s financial audits.18  Throughout the
ordeal of her discovering, disclosing, and assisting in the investiga-
tion of the WorldCom scandal, Cooper read and reread the 23rd
(one of the many articles that criticize the inadequacies of the New York
Whistleblower Statute).
9 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY ABRIDGED 1289 (7th ed. 2000).
10 See, e.g., Thomas E. Egan, Wrongful Discharge and Federal Preemption: Nuclear
Whistleblower Protection Under State Law and Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act, 17
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 405, 405-06 (1990).
11 Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 1, at 26; see also Corbo, supra note 8, at 142.
12 See, e.g., Egan, supra note 10, at 405-06.
13 Amanda Ripley, The Night Detective, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002/Jan. 6, 2003, at 37.
14 Id. at 39.
15 Id. at 39-40.
16 Id. at 37.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 39-40.
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Psalm: “Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of
death, I will fear no evil: for thou art with me.”19
Although revealing an employer’s illegalities might not be as
loathsome as death, it comes quite close.  Whistleblowers right the
wrongs of their employers with the full understanding that, in ex-
change, they might be required to pay a hefty price.20  Because of
the important and unique function of whistleblowers, they should
be afforded protection that will not only encourage the disclosure
of wrongful practices, but also the timely disclosure of these prac-
tices.  However, employers and the business community as a whole,
as well as some scholars, advocate for a narrow scope of protec-
tion.21  They believe that limited protection is necessary to enforce
employee loyalty, to avoid disruptions of employee morale, to pre-
serve internal company security and procedures, to avoid public
embarrassment of the employer, and to prevent employees from
abusing such protection.22
Despite opposition from both the business and academic com-
munities, the New York State Legislature enacted the state’s
Whistleblower Statute23 in 1984 to “protect [private] employees
from adverse or retaliatory personnel action by their employers
when they have reported information concerning the employer’s
[wrongful practices].”24  The statute is also intended to “promote
enforcement of the law, and give needed protection to employees
who wish to act as law-abiding citizens without fear of losing their
job.”25  However noble its goals, the statute, as interpreted by the
New York courts, fails to adequately protect employees who reveal
their employers’ illegal practices.  Under the current judicial inter-
pretation of the statute, a whistleblower like Cooper would be left
without relief if she were fired for exposing the WorldCom ac-
counting fraud that led to the loss of at least $3 billion in share-
holders’ investment and 17,000 jobs.26
19 Id. at 40.
20 See Corbo, supra note 8, at 142.
21 See, e.g., Susan Sauter, The Employee Health and Safety Whistleblower Protection Act
and the Conscientious Employee: The Potential for Federal Statutory Enforcement of the Public
Policy Exception to Employment at Will, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 513, 545 (1990); Corbo, supra
note 8, at 142-43.
22 See, e.g., Corbo, supra note 8, at 142.
23 See N.Y. Lab. Law § 740 (McKinney 2002).
24 Governor’s Mem. Approving N.Y. Lab. Law § 740, N.Y. Session Laws of 1984, ch.
660, 3624 (McKinney).
25 Id.
26 See Ripley, supra note 13, at 37.  A New York State private employee often does
not receive protection from federal whistleblower statutes, because “[w]hile federal
whistleblower statutes provide broad protection for government employees, they pro-
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There are two obvious problems with the language of the stat-
ute and the courts’ interpretation of the statute.  First, to obtain
statutory protection, an employee must show an actual violation of
the law, rule or regulation.27  The employee’s reasonable belief
that a violation has occurred or is occurring is insufficient.  Sec-
ond, the actual violation of the law, rule or regulation must create
and present a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety,28 which the courts have interpreted to exclude corporate
wrongdoing that is monetary or financial.
To solve these problems, the New York statute must be
amended so that it will fulfill its goals of promoting law enforce-
ment and providing much-needed protection to whistleblowers.
Thus, instead of requiring an employee to show an actual violation
of the law, rule or regulation, an employee should be protected if
she or he reasonably believes that a violation of the law, rule or
regulation has occurred or is occurring.  In other words, if the em-
ployee can show that a reasonably prudent person under the cir-
cumstances would conclude that a violation has occurred or is
occurring, then she or he should be granted statutory protection
for disclosing the violation.  Furthermore, the application of the
statute should not be limited to violations that create and present a
substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.  Rather,
the scope of applicable violations should be broadened to include
any violation that creates and presents harm to the public wel-
fare–this would include corporate financial wrongdoing.
Part I of this article revisits the New York courts’ treatment of
whistleblowers prior to the enactment of the New York
Whistleblower Statute, and discusses the protection granted to
whistleblowers subsequent to enactment.  Part II examines the
problems created by the language of the statute and the courts’
interpretation of the statute.  Part III explores whistleblower stat-
utes in sister states, and Part IV suggests proposed amendments to
the statute.
tect private employees primarily from retribution for enforcing only certain public
health statutes.”  Sara A. Corello, Note, In-House Counsel’s Right to Sue for Retaliatory
Discharge, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 389, 394 (1992).
27 N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(2); see also Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 88 N.Y.2d 869, 871
(1996).
28 N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(2).
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I. NEW YORK WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTE RESTRICTS EMPLOYERS’
UNFETTERED POWER TO DISCHARGE PRIVATE EMPLOYEES
Until the New York State Legislature enacted the
Whistleblower Statute in 1984, New York State law provided private
employees with virtually no legal protection from retaliatory action
following their exposure of employers’ wrongful activities.29  This
was a result of the common law employment-at-will doctrine, which
affords employers the unfettered power to terminate the employ-
ment of at-will employees for good, bad, or no cause at all.30
The New York Court of Appeals decision in Murphy v. American
Home Products Corporation provides an illuminating examination of
the state’s employment-at-will doctrine.31  In 1957, Joseph Murphy
was hired by American Home Products Corporation as an account-
ant.  He was fired in 1980 after more than twenty years of employ-
ment.32  Prior to his termination, in 1976, Murphy was allegedly
demoted for reporting accounting inaccuracies that involved al-
tered invoices.33  Two years later, in 1978, he filed a report on cer-
tain illegal pension reserves, but the report was ignored by the
corporation.34  Then, in 1980, he again raised the same issue with
two superior officials, but “he was told he did not know what he was
talking about,” and was fired immediately.35  According to Murphy,
when he returned for his belongings the next day, “he was placed
under guard, barred from saying goodbye to his colleagues . . . and
his possessions [were] dumped on the street beside him.”36  In his
lawsuit against the American Home Products Corporation, Murphy
claimed that he was terminated in retaliation for revealing to his
superior officers that he had uncovered illegal accounting manipu-
lations and for refusing to engage in the alleged illegal acts.37
Joining the appellate and trial courts, the New York Court of
Appeals ruled against Murphy, stating that it would not recognize a
29 See Corbo, supra note 8, at 142 (“Until recently, whistleblowers had no legal
recourse for enduring the consequences of whistleblowing.”).
30 See, e.g., Martin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121 (1895) (“[T]he hiring of
the plaintiff was a hiring at will and the defendant [employer] was at liberty to termi-
nate [the relationship] at any time.”).
31 58 N.Y.2d 293 (1983).
32 Id. at 297.
33 Murphy v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 112 Misc. 2d 507, 508 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982), aff’d,
58 N.Y.2d 293 (1983).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 508-09.
37 Murphy, 58 N.Y.2d at 297-98.  Murphy also alleged that he was terminated be-
cause he was 59 years old. Id.
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cause of action for wrongful discharge of an at-will employee, be-
cause “such recognition must await action of the legislature.”38
The court also noted that such recognition would alter New York
State’s long-settled employment-at-will doctrine, which states that
an employment for “an indefinite term . . . is presumed to be a
hiring at will,” and “may be freely terminated by either party at any
time for any reason or even for no reason.”39  Changing such a
well-established law, the court reasoned, “[was] best left to the
legislature.”40
Subsequently, in 1984, one year after the Court of Appeals de-
cided Murphy, the New York Legislature acted.41  It passed the
Whistleblower Statute,42 and provided “affirmative protection”43 to
private employees who report information about their employers’
violation of law, rule or regulation that creates and presents a sub-
stantial and specific danger to the public health or safety.  One of
the goals of the statute is to encourage those at the working level to
report hazards, improprieties and wrongdoings to supervisors, and
to a public authority, if necessary.44  The hope is that the statute
would encourage employees to disclose employers’ wrongful con-
duct, protect the welfare of the people of New York State, and give
needed protection to employees who wish to act as law-abiding citi-
zens without the fear of losing their job.45  Unfortunately, because
of limitations in the statutory language and the courts’ interpreta-
tion of the statute, this hope often remains just that–a hope.
38 Id. at 297.
39 Id. at 300 (citing Martin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 121 (1895) (“[A]
general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will . . . .  A hiring at so much a
day, week, month or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no
presumption attaches that it was for a day even . . . .”  If the hiring is at will, then
either the employee or the employer is at “liberty to terminate the [employment] at
any time.”)).
40 Id. at 301.
41 It has been suggested that the Whistleblower Statute “was enacted in response to
the [Court of Appeals] decision in Murphy . . . which upheld the corporate employer’s
right to terminate an at-will employee who revealed certain illegal accounting manip-
ulations to officers and directors of the corporation and refused to engage in such
improprieties.” Remba v. Fed’n Employment & Guidance Serv., 149 A.D.2d 131, 139-40
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (Ellerin, J., dissenting), aff’d, 76 N.Y.2d 801 (1990).
42 N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(2)(a).
43 Judiciary, Mem. of Office of Ct. Admin., N.Y. Session Laws of 1984, ch. 665, 3875
(McKinney).
44 Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 A.D.2d 169, 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
45 Governor’s Mem., supra note 24 (“Encouraging employees to bring violations to
the attention of their employers and shielding them from employer retaliation if they
disclose wrongful conduct to authorities, will protect the welfare of the people of this
State, promote enforcement of the law, and give needed protection to employees who
wish to act as law-abiding citizens without fear of losing their jobs.”).
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A. The Language of the New York Whistleblower Statute Provides
Limited Protection to Whistleblowers
The most important provision of the Whistleblower Statute is
Subsection Two.  Entitled “Prohibitions,” it provides:
An employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel action46
against an employee because such employee does any of the
following:
(a) discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a pub-
lic body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that is
in violation of law, rule or regulation47 which violation cre-
ates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the
public health or safety;
(b) provides information to, or testifies before, any public body
conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into any
such violation of a law, rule or regulation by such employer;
or
(c) objects to, or refuses to participate in any such activity, pol-
icy or practice in violation of a law, rule or regulation.
The statute’s plain language prohibits an employer from tak-
ing any adverse or retaliatory personnel action, including termina-
tion, suspension or demotion,48 against an employee who discloses,
threatens to disclose, provides information concerning the em-
ployer’s activities, or refuses to participate in such activities that are
in violation of the law, rule or regulation, and that create and pre-
sent a specific and substantial danger to the public health or
safety.49
In reality, an employee has to overcome two major hurdles
before falling within the protective parameters of the statute.  First,
an employee seeking protection has to meet an immense eviden-
tiary burden of demonstrating that her or his employer is in actual
violation of a law, rule or regulation.50  This is the result of both
the statute’s failure to define the term—“violation,”51 and the
courts’ insistence on interpreting the term to mean “actual viola-
46 “Retaliatory personnel action” means the discharge, suspension or demotion of
an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the
terms and conditions of employment.  N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(1)(e).
47 “Law, rule or regulation” includes any duly enacted statute or ordinance or any
rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to any federal, state or local statute or ordi-
nance.  N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(1)(c).
48 N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(1)(e).
49 N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(2); see also Remba v. Fed’n Employment & Guidance Serv., 149
A.D.2d 131, 134 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (referring to comments in the Bill Jacket of
N.Y. Lab. Law § 740).
50 E.g., Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 88 N.Y.2d 869 (1996).
51 See N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(1).
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tion.”  Second, the Whistleblower Statute, as it is written, protects a
limited class of employees—only those who blow the whistle on ac-
tivities that are illegal and that “create and present a substantial
and specific danger to the public health or safety.”52  This has led
to many criticisms since the statute’s enactment.53  For example,
the New York State Attorney General complained that the bill
“does not clearly protect all ‘whistle blower’ employees.”54  As if he
had foreseen the recent corporate scandals, he expressed his con-
cern that the bill would not provide a remedy for employees who
“refuse to engage in or who reveal illegal financial or accounting
practices,” and urged that “this defect in the bill be cured by future
legislation.”55  The Attorney General’s concern materialized when
the New York courts restricted the statutory protection by categori-
cally excluding employees who disclose corporate financial wrong-
doing from the protected class of whistleblowers.
B. The New York Courts Further Narrowed the Statutory Protection
Afforded to Whistleblowers
The New York courts, reluctant to depart from the long-stand-
ing doctrine of employment-at-will which guaranteed employers
unfettered power to dismiss employees at any time for any or no
reason, have deemed the Whistleblower Statute to be a mere “nar-
row and specific statutory exception” to the doctrine.56  The courts’
interpretation of the statute, more specifically their interpretation
of the term, “violation,” has produced discouraging results that
lead one to wonder about the effectiveness of the statute.  For ex-
ample, the courts refused to provide statutory protection to Lois
Kern who reported an alleged rape to the Monroe County District
52 See N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(2), (3).
53 E.g., Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time for an Unjust Dismissal Statute in New York,
54 BROOK. L. REV. 1137, 1183-84 (1989) (“Unfortunately, [N.Y. Labor Law § 740] is a
mere shadow of the whistleblower statutes proposed by the state assembly, the New
York Civil Liberties Union, the New York State AFL-CIO, and other lobby groups[,]”
and “there is much that is wrong with New York’s Whistleblower Statute.”); Corbo,
supra note 8, at 147 (“The difficulties in asserting a viable claim under New York’s
whistleblower statute become magnified upon examination of specific sections of the
statute.”); Remba, 149 A.D.2d at 139-40 (Ellerin, J., dissenting) (discussing the Attor-
ney General’s memorandum approving N.Y. Lab. Law § 740).
54 Remba, 149 A.D.2d at 134 (citing the Attorney General’s memorandum approv-
ing N.Y. Lab. Law § 740) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added).
55 Id.
56 Remba, 149 A.D.2d at 135.
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Attorney’s Office.57
The employee, Lois Kern, worked as a part-time program aide
at DePaul’s adult community residence for mentally handicapped
individuals.58  She discovered a male resident engaging in sexual
intercourse with a female resident who appeared not to have con-
sented and who might have been coerced.59  Kern made “a nota-
tion to that effect in the female resident’s permanent file and also
reported the incident to the . . . District Attorney’s office.”60  Her
employment was soon terminated.  She then commenced a lawsuit
against DePaul Mental Health Services under the newly-enacted
Whistleblower Statute, alleging that the termination was the result
of her disclosure.61
Both the Whistleblower Statute and the New York courts pro-
vided Kern with no relief after she lost her job for revealing a sex-
ual intercourse occurrence that, based on the “fair implication” of
the facts, could have been nonconsensual.62  The trial court rea-
soned that Kern failed to prove that her employer was in actual
violation63 of any law.64  The court interpreted “violation”65 to
mean actual violation, and held that “[a] belief on the part of the
employee that a violation has occurred is insufficient to invoke the
statute’s protection.”66  Thus, the trial court dismissed Kern’s law-
suit.67  The Appellate Division affirmed.68
Another example of the ineffectiveness of the statute resulting
from its limited application is Remba v. Federation Employment and
57 Kern v. DePaul Mental Health Servs., 139 Misc. 2d 970, 971-72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988),
aff’d, 152 A.D.2d 957 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 615 (1989).
58 Id. at 971.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 972.
63 Id.  Although “[Kern] had some factual basis for her conclusion that the alleged
intercourse . . . was nonconsensual in nature,” the court nonetheless found that the
sexual intercourse was “consensual in nature despite the female resident’s [mental]
limitations.” Id.  Thus, the court found that Kern was unprotected by the statute be-
cause there was no actual violation of the law on the part of the employer.
64 The court also ruled in favor of the defendant because, “[t]o the extent that
plaintiff would be able to prove her contention that even consensual sexual inter-
course violated in-house rules and regulations [of DePaul Mental Health Services],
such violation, consisting of consensual sexual acts, cannot be said to create a substan-
tial and specific danger to the public health or safety.” Id. at 974.
65 N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(2).
66 Kern, 139 Misc. 2d at 973.
67 Id. at 974.
68 Kern, 152 A.D.2d at 957-58.
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Guidance Service.69  Claire Remba was employed by the defendant as
a coordinator of employment services.70  The defendant, a not-for-
profit agency, received New York City funding for finding employ-
ment for job applicants, or placing them in educational or training
programs.71  Remba alleged that she “was discharged because of
her objection to, and refusal to participate in” the defendant’s
fraudulent billing of New York City for placements it never made.72
The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling to dismiss
Remba’s complaint, reasoning that the defendant’s practice of
fraudulent billing did not create or present a substantial and spe-
cific danger to the public’s health or safety, as required by the stat-
ute.73  Furthermore, the court noted that even if Remba
“reasonably believed that the alleged fraudulent billing practice
could create a substantial and specific danger to the public health
or safety,” she would not be protected because the statute required
that “there be not only an actual, as opposed to a possible, viola-
tion,” but also an actual and substantial presence of danger to the
public health or safety.74  New York’s highest court affirmed, stating
that “the conduct complained of–fraudulent billing–is not the type
of violation which creates a ‘substantial and specific danger to the
public health or safety.’”75  Thus, the courts denied Remba statu-
tory protection on the ground that the violation of law did not cre-
ate or present a substantial and specific danger to the public health
or safety, even though her employer had actually engaged in fraudu-
lent billing practices.76 Remba shows that had Cynthia Cooper, the
WorldCom whistleblower, been a New York State private employee,
69 149 A.D.2d 131 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), aff’d, 76 N.Y.2d 801 (1990).
70 Id. at 132.
71 Id. at 133.
72 Id.
73 Id. (stating Remba “has failed to set forth facts satisfying the statute’s . . . re-
quirement, that the alleged violation of law, i.e., fraudulent billing, would create and
present a substantial and specific danger to the public health or safety”).
74 Id. at 135 (stating that “[r]easonable belief as a basis for protection under [the
statute] will not suffice”).
75 Remba v. Fed’n Employment & Guidance Serv., 76 N.Y.2d 801, 802 (1990)  (citing
Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 A.D.2d 169, 175-77 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (hold-
ing that fraudulent banking activities do not create a substantial and specific danger
to public health or safety)); Vella v. United Cerebral Palsy, 141 Misc. 2d 976, 978 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1988) (improper purchasing practice does not create a substantial and spe-
cific danger to the public health or safety).
76 Remba v. Fed’n Employment & Guidance Serv., 149 A.D.2d 132, 139-40 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1989) (Ellerin, J., dissenting) (“I cannot agree with the conclusion, that the stat-
ute does not cover the larcenous conduct here involved, based upon fraudulent bill-
ing of the City of New York for placements of unemployed persons in jobs or training
that were, in fact, never made.”).
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her disclosure of her employer’s fraudulent accounting practices
would not have entitled her to statutory protection against termina-
tion for the disclosure.
II. WHISTLEBLOWERS MUST OVERCOME TWO OBSTACLES BEFORE
FALLING WITHIN THE PROTECTIVE PARAMETERS OF
THE STATUTE
The cases, Kern and Remba, are just two of the many that
demonstrate the inadequacy of the statute in protecting
whistleblowers.77  The legislature’s failure to define the term “viola-
tion” has resulted in a judicial interpretation that greatly restricts
the application of the statute.  Under the current interpretation, a
whistleblower would be protected only if she or he can show that
the employer has actually violated a law, rule or regulation.  Addi-
tionally, the whistleblower must show that the violation creates and
presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or
safety, which, as the courts have concluded, excludes corporate
wrongdoing or white-collar crimes.
A. The New York Courts’ Interpretation of “Violation” Resulted in the
Denial of Protection to Whistleblowers who Disclose Violations
That They Reasonably Believe Exist
The definition of the term “violation” is crucial to the statute’s
applicability.  Based on how the term is defined, the scope of the
protection changes dramatically.  The term “violation” can have
three distinct meanings: an actual violation, an action that the em-
ployee reasonably believes to be a violation, or a possible violation.
If the term “violation” means an actual violation, then whether
an employer is in violation can only be established by the actual
existence of a violation.  This implies that an employee would be
protected only if she or he can prove that there is an actual viola-
tion.  This interpretation offers the least statutory protection to
77 E.g., Pail v. Precise Imports Corp., 256 A.D.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (the
cause of action was properly dismissed because “an employee’s good faith but errone-
ous belief that  . . .  a violation exists [is] insufficient”); Hughes v. Gibson Courier Serv.
Corp., 218 A.D.2d 684, 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (plaintiff did not state a claim when
he failed to prove that the employer was in actual violation and that the “alleged
wrongdoing did not present an actual and substantial danger to the public health”);
Connolly v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 161 A.D.2d 520, 523 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)
(disclosure of “certain illegal and unsafe activities” of a co-worker is not protected,
because the plaintiff merely “allege[d] in a conclusory manner that [the co-worker] is
capable of ‘erratically violent’ behavior and, therefore, poses a danger to . . . the
public”); Lamagna v. Ass’n for the Help of Retarded Children, Inc., 158 A.D.2d 588, 589
(N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (refusal to participate in fiscal improprieties is not protected).
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whistleblowers, because unless the employee can show that the em-
ployer actually violated or is actually violating a law, rule or regula-
tion, the employee does not fall within the parameters of the
statutory protection.  The actual violation interpretation is cur-
rently adopted by the New York courts.78
If the term “violation” means an action that the employee rea-
sonably believes to be a violation, then the courts would use an objec-
tive standard of “reasonably prudent person” to determine whether
the employer is in violation.  Under this interpretation, an em-
ployee would be protected if a reasonably prudent person under
the totality of the circumstances would objectively conclude that
there is or has been a violation.  Whistleblower statutes in many
states use this definition to set the boundaries of statutory
protection.79
Finally, if the term is interpreted to mean a “possible violation,”
then the standard would be that of the whistleblower’s “subjective
and personal belief.”  This meaning offers the greatest protection
to whistleblowers, because despite what is actually true, or what a
reasonably prudent person would believe as true, as long as the
employee subjectively believes that there is a violation, she or he
would be protected.
The New York Whistleblower Statute’s omission of a definition
for “violation” has left the New York courts free to interpret the
term as “actual violation.”80  The courts reasoned that the language
and legislative history of the Whistleblower Statute support a con-
struction “requiring proof of an actual violation of law.”81  To bol-
ster this argument, the New York Court of Appeals compared the
Whistleblower Statute to the parallel public sector whistleblowers’
statute, stating that while “the public sector whistleblowers’ statute
was amended to provid[e] protection for disclosure of information
which the employee reasonably believes to be true and reasonably be-
lieves constitutes an improper governmental action,” there was “no
similar amendment” to the private sector Whistleblower Statute.82
78 E.g., Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 88 N.Y.2d 869, 871 (1996).
79 E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52
(Anderson 2003); MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2
(1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 2003).
80 E.g., Remba, 149 A.D.2d at 135 (“The law requires that there be not only an
actual, as opposed to a possible, violation, but also an actual and substantial present
danger to the public health.” (emphasis added)); Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 88 N.Y.2d
869, 871 (1996) (“[A] cause of action predicated on Labor Law § 740 requires proof
of an actual violation.” (emphasis added)).
81 Bordell, 88 N.Y.2d at 871.
82 Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
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Furthermore, Judge Sullivan of the First Department of the Appel-
late Division pointed out that, prior to and since the enactment of
the Whistleblower Statute, “bills have been introduced in the New
York State Senate to broaden the statutory standard to one of rea-
sonable cause [or reasonable belief].  The legislature, however, has
consistently and repeatedly resisted any such change.”83  Judge
Patlow of the New York Supreme Court in Monroe County echoed
Judge Sullivan’s statement, and remarked that prior versions of the
statute “which made reference to an employee’s suspicion of viola-
tion were never passed.”84
As a result of the courts’ decision to adopt the “actual viola-
tion” interpretation, the potential application of the statute has
been greatly limited; and the restrictive interpretation has placed
an immense burden of proof on whistleblowers seeking protection.
For example, in Bordell v. General Electric Company,85 Frank Bordell,
a health physicist, reported, first to his supervisor and then to the
Department of Energy, his preliminary finding that as many as
seven employees in the defendant corporation “might have been
exposed to radiation at levels sufficient to trigger the mandatory
reporting requirements” of the Department of Energy.86  He was
denied relief after being discharged for whistleblowing because he
could not prove that the defendant had actually violated any law.87
While consistently interpreting the term “violation” to mean
“actual violation,”88 the courts have declared that the adoption of a
reasonable belief standard would further the statute’s laudable
purpose of encouraging employees to report violations of health
and safety laws and regulations.89  However, they emphasized that
“courts are not permitted to interpret laws as they would have them
written,”90 and that “any additional protection must come from the
Legislature.”91  It appears that the courts are unwilling, possibly un-
83 Remba, 149 A.D.2d at 135.  Prior to and since enactment of the statute, bills have
been introduced in the New York State Legislature to broaden the statutory protec-
tion. Id. at 139-40; see also Kern v. DePaul Mental Health Servs., 139 Misc. 2d 970, 973
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988), aff’d, 152 A.D.2d 957 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), appeal denied, 74
N.Y.2d 615 (1989).
84 Kern, 139 Misc. 2d at 973 (citing to several bills introduced in the Legislature).
85 88 N.Y.2d 869 (1996).
86 Id. at 870-71.
87 Id. at 871.
88 E.g., id; Khan v. State Univ. of N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr., 288 A.D.2d 350 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001) (“An employee’s good-faith reasonable belief that an actual violation of a law,
rule, or regulation occurred is insufficient; there must be an actual violation.”).
89 Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 208 A.D.2d 219, 221 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
90 Id.
91 Remba v. Fed’n Employment & Guidance Serv., 76 N.Y.2d 801, 803 (1990) (“[A]l-
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able, to expand the limited interpretation of the term, to broaden
the applicability of the statute, and to prevent troublesome deci-
sions that are not aligned with the statute’s purpose of encourag-
ing disclosure of wrongful practices.  Thus, any change of the
statutory protection must be initiated by the Legislature.
The New York State Legislature should amend the
Whistleblower Statute to extend protection to an employee who
discloses a violation that she or he reasonably believes exists.
Under the current statute, interpreted as to require proof of actual
violation, prior to disclosure, each whistleblower has to “become
equal parts policeman, prosecutor, judge, and jury.”92  Moreover,
an employee could never be sure that a law, rule or regulation has
been actually violated until the defendant employer is found guilty
in court.93  The requirement of “actual violation” places a tremen-
dous burden of proof on the employee, and has led to nonsensical
results that are unjust, unreasonable, and contrary to the spirit of
the statute.94  The Ohio Supreme Court illustrated the absurdity of
requiring an employee to show actual violation with this example:
“[s]uppose . . . a dispatcher of a taxi company is told by an on-duty
driver that the driver is drunk.  The employee believes that the
driver does indeed sound intoxicated.  Does the dispatcher need to
chase down the driver, perform field sobriety, breathalyzer and
blood tests before he may report to his supervisor that the driver is
driving while intoxicated?”95
Given the seriousness of the alleged crime and the importance
of prompt reporting, Lois Kern, the employee of DePaul’s adult
community residence for the mentally handicapped, should not be
required to delay her reporting to the District Attorney’s Office
about her discovery of a male resident engaging in sexual inter-
course with a female resident where “a fair implication” of the facts
suggested that the sexual intercourse was nonconsensual in na-
ture.96  Yet, under the current judicial interpretation of the statute,
it is not enough that she had evidence or reasonable belief that a
rape had occurred, but rather, a jury verdict that a rape had oc-
though the present ‘Whistleblower’ statute has been criticized by commentators for
not affording sufficient safeguards against retaliatory discharge, any additional protec-
tion must come from the Legislature.”) (internal citations and quotation marks
omitted)).
92 Fox v. Bowling Green, 668 N.E.2d 898, 902 (1996).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Kern v. DePaul Mental Health Servs., 139 Misc. 2d 970, 972 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988),
aff’d, 152 A.D.2d 957 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 615 (1989).
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curred is needed to meet the requirement of actual violation.  And
what about Frank Bordell, the health physicist?  The law should not
demand that he investigate further before reporting to his supervi-
sor and to the Department of Energy on the likely radiation expo-
sure, especially when the employer had prevented him from
conducting additional testing.97  Bordell should not be asked to
keep silent while reasonably believing that employees are being
harmed.  However, keeping silent is exactly what the Whistleblower
Statute demands.
A whistleblower statute that expects whistleblowers to be vigi-
lant, attuned to the public’s health or safety, and sometimes even
brave, should not also require employees to be infallible.98  To re-
quire a whistleblower to show actual violation not only delays re-
porting of violations that endanger public welfare, but might even
prevent the employee from reporting the violation at all.99  Thus,
the New York Whistleblower Statute, which mandates a showing of
actual violation, should be amended because it fails to accomplish
the statutory goal of encouraging disclosure by not extending the
much-needed protection to employees who fear discharge
prompted by the disclosure.100
To correct the problems of demanding employee infallibility
and of failure to accomplish statutory goals, the statute should util-
ize the objective standard of “reasonable belief.”  This standard
strikes a sensible balance between an employer’s power to dismiss
an employee and the statutory goal of encouraging disclosure of
employers’ wrongful conduct.  On the one hand, it will prevent
outcomes similar to that of Kern and Bordell, which required proof
of actual violation.  On the other hand, it will allow employers to
dismiss employees who report possible wrongdoing based on noth-
ing more than a hunch.  If an employee can show that, in the total-
ity of the circumstances, she or he, as a reasonably prudent person,
reasonably believes that there is or has been a violation, then why
should the employee not be protected from retaliation following
disclosure?  This standard is a sound middle ground between actual
violation, where a violation must actually be proven to exist, and
97 Bordell v. Gen. Elec. Co., 208 A.D.2d 219, 220 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
98 Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 677 N.E.2d 308, 309 (1997).
99 Id.
100 See, e.g., Pail v. Precise Imports Corp., 256 A.D.2d 73, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)
(erroneous belief that a violation exists is insufficient); Hughes v. Gibson Courier Serv.
Corp., 218 A.D.2d 684, 685 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (plaintiff failed to prove actual viola-
tion); Connolly v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 161 A.D.2d 520, 523 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990) (merely making allegations in a conclusory manner is insufficient).
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possible violation, where a violation is based solely on the em-
ployee’s subjective belief.
However, even if a whistleblower meets the actual violation re-
quirement, she or he has only overcome one of the two hurdles to
invoking statutory protection.
B. The Statutory Language of “Substantial and Specific Danger to the
Public Health and Safety” Harms Private Employees who
Report Corporate Wrongdoing
Like “violation,” the term “substantial and specific danger to
the public health and safety” is not defined in the New York
Whistleblower Statute.101  The New York courts have held that a
doctor “practicing medicine while impaired by a psychiatric disabil-
ity,”102 a doctor’s failure to properly document and/or obtain in-
formed consents for a bronchoscopic procedure,103 “negligent,
poorly trained, and undisciplined” EMS paramedics attending pa-
tients,104 a restaurant owner’s failure to comply with structural and
safety requirements,105 and an employer’s failure to maintain a
smoke-free work area for nonsmoking employees106 are violations
that create and present substantial and specific danger to the pub-
lic health or safety.
However, the courts have also repeatedly held that disclosure
of corporate financial wrongdoing is not within the statutory pro-
tection.  The New York Supreme Court ruled in a recent case,
Feinman v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, that the Whistleblower Stat-
ute is inapplicable to disclosures of fraudulent or other improper
economic activities.107  The court further noted that if corporate
wrongdoing is to be prohibited or sanctioned, “the remedy must
be a legislative one.  The court cannot amend the statute.”108  Vio-
lations such as fraudulent billing,109 wrongful payments and over-
payments,110 improper banking activities,111 fiscal “improprie-
101 See N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(1).
102 Finkelstein v. Cornell Univ. Med. Coll., 269 A.D.2d 114, 116 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
103 Kraus v. New Rochelle Hosp. Med. Ctr., 216 A.D.2d 360, 365 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
104 Rodgers v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 211 A.D.2d 248, 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
105 Granser v. Box Tree S. Ltd., 164 Misc. 2d 191, 198 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
106 Bompane v. Enzolabs, Inc., 160 Misc. 2d 315, 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994).
107 Feinman v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 193 Misc. 2d 496, 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
108 Id.
109 E.g., Remba v. Fed’n Employment & Guidance Serv., 76 N.Y.2d 801, 802 (1990)
(“[A]fter reviewing the legislative history, we conclude that the conduct complained
of–fraudulent billing–is not the type of violation which creates a substantial and spe-
cific danger to the public health or safety.”).
110 Vella v. United Cerebral Palsy, Inc., 141 Misc. 2d 976, 978 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
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ties,”112 and violations of securities laws113 have all been deemed
violations that do not create and present substantial and specific
danger to the public health or safety.  Thus, disclosure of such a
violation is not within the statutory protection of the Whistleblower
Statute.
In support of this conclusion, the courts cited to the New York
State Attorney General’s memorandum approving the statute,
which stated that it was “unclear” whether the bill would provide a
remedy for employees who refuse to engage in, or who reveal ille-
gal financial or accounting practices.114  Courts have viewed this
statement to mean that disclosure of white-collar crimes is not cov-
ered by the statute and that “fraudulent billing [is] beyond the stat-
ute’s purview.”115  Also, the First Department of the Appellate
Division stated that, in 1981, “the Legislature rejected a bill which
would have protected employees from retaliatory discharge for tak-
ing actions which benefit society in general.”116  Instead, the statute
that was passed specifically stated that for an employee to be pro-
tected, the disclosure must concern a violation that “creates and
presents a substantial and specific danger to the public health or
safety.”117  Moreover, courts observed that whistleblower statutes of
other states recognize the distinction between white-collar crimes
and violations of law that harm public health and safety.118
Although corporate wrongdoing does not necessarily create or
present a substantial and specific danger to the public health or
safety, its harm to the public is certainly evident, especially in the
post-Enron era, where, nationally, corporate wrongdoing has cost
investors billions of dollars,119 has led to massive job loss, and en-
ded or deferred retirement dreams for many workers.120  Wrongful
111 Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust Co., 152 A.D.2d 169, 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
112 Lamagna v. Ass’n for the Help of Retarded Children, Inc., 158 A.D.2d 588, 589 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990).
113 Feinman v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 193 Misc. 2d 496, 497 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002).
114 Remba v. Fed’n Employment & Guidance Serv., 149 A.D.2d 131, 134 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989).
115 Id. at 134-35; see, e.g., Lamagna, 158 A.D.2d at 589 (refusal to participate in fiscal
improprieties is not protected).
116 Remba, 149 A.D.2d at 135 n.2 (citing 1981 N.Y. Assembly Bill 2566).
117 N.Y. Lab. Law § 740(2)(a).
118 Remba, 149 A.D.2d at 135 (citing MD. CODE ANN., art 64A, § 12G; 5 U.S.C. § 2302
(b)(8)(A)(ii), and stating that reprisal for disclosure of “mismanagement, a gross
waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public
health or safety” is prohibited).  Similar language also appears in the following stat-
utes: 5 U.S.C. § 2303(a)(2) (2001); 10 U.S.C. § 1587(b)(1)(B), (2)(B) (2001); 20 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN., ch 127, § 63b119c.1(1)(ii) (2004).
119 Byrne, supra note 2, at 51.
120 Higuera, supra note 3.
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corporate conduct has ripple effects on the nation’s economy.  For
example, false bookkeeping, one form of corporate wrongdoing,
can cause corporate collapses and investor losses in the stock mar-
ket; and since “stock ownership has spread so far throughout the
population[,] . . . the impact of a corporate collapse–and of the
falling stock market generally–is felt by many . . . Americans.”121
During the first year after the recent corporate scandals were
revealed, the New York State economy lost $2.9 billion.122  The
state’s tax revenues decreased by $1 billion because of the lower
personal income and diminished business and sales tax collec-
tion.123  The New York State Common Retirement Fund, which
contains the assets of the New York State and Local Employees’
Retirement System, the New York State and Local Police and Fire-
men Retirement System, and the Public Employees’ Group Life In-
surance Plan, lost $9 billion in value from its equity portfolio.124
The New York State Comptroller estimated that the scandals con-
tributed almost $7 billion in losses to the New York City pension
system.125  Because of the devastation that corporate wrongdoing
can cause and has caused to the nation and to New York State spe-
cifically, amending the New York Whistleblower Statute is
imperative.
In her dissent, Judge Ellerin in the First Department of the
Appellate Division declared that the current statute protects, or at
least should protect, the disclosure of white-collar crimes on three
grounds.126  First, the Attorney General’s memorandum did not
state that the disclosure of white-collar crimes is not within the stat-
utory protection; instead, it merely manifested concern because it
was unclear whether the bill would provide a remedy in all situa-
tions.127  Second, the Attorney General stated that the bill was in-
tended to protect employees in connection with employer
wrongdoing that was “inimical to the public welfare.”128  Corporate
121 Jonathan D. Glater, Mad as Hell: Hard Times for White-Collar Crime, N.Y. TIMES,
July 28, 2002, § 4, at 5, col. 1.
122 N.Y.S. Comptroller Report, Impact of the Corporate Scandals on New York State, Aug.
1, 2003, available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/aug03/corpgovernrpt.
pdf.
123 Id. at 19.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 2.
126 Remba v. Fed’n Employment & Guidance Serv., 149 A.D.2d 131, 139 (N.Y. App. Div.
1989) (Ellerin, J., dissenting).
127 Id.
128 Id.
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wrongdoing is certainly inimical to the public welfare,129 as evi-
denced by the economic impact of recent corporate scandals.
Lastly, the statute was enacted in response to Murphy, in which the
New York Court of Appeals upheld the corporate employer’s right
to terminate an at-will employee who revealed certain illegal ac-
count manipulations.130  The problem that gave rise to the statute
is “significan[t] and the intent of the statute should be evaluated in
that context.”131
Despite the damage that can be and has been caused by corpo-
rate wrongdoing, the courts’ reluctance to include disclosure of
white-collar crimes under the statutory protection of the
Whistleblower Statute,132 like their insistence on interpreting “vio-
lation” as “actual violation,” has made the application of the statute
inconsistent with its statutory purpose of encouraging disclosure.133
Similar to the problem of defining “violation” restrictively, it ap-
pears that any change in employee protection must originate in
the Legislature.
Instead of requiring proof that the violation creates and
presents a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety, protection should be granted upon the disclosure of a viola-
tion of the law, rule or regulation that creates and presents any
harm to the public welfare.  This amendment will surely include
the disclosure of corporate wrongdoing.  The Legislature and the
courts must remember that the goals of the statute are “[to] pro-
mote enforcement of the law, and [to] give needed protection to
employees who wish to act as law-abiding citizens without fear of
losing their job;”134 the exclusion of disclosure of corporate wrong-
doing unquestionably contradicts such goals.
III. SISTER STATES’ WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTES PROVIDE
GREATER PROTECTION
New York is the preeminent global financial center as well as
the home to many corporate headquarters.  It houses 52 of the For-
129 Id.
130 Murphy v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 297 (1983).
131 Id.
132 Besides disclosure of corporate wrongdoing, at least one appellate court has
concluded that the disclosure of violent crimes against individuals is also not within
the purview of the statute. Kern v. DePaul Mental Health Servs., 152 A.D.2d 957, 957-58
(N.Y. App. Div. 1989), appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 615 (1989) (stating that the alleged
rape “may have presented a danger to the health or safety of the individual patient,
but did not threaten the health or safety of the public at large”).
133 Governor’s Mem., supra note 24.
134 Id.
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tune 500 companies’ headquarters,135 and the world’s largest com-
mercial and investment banking entities, such as Citigroup, J.P.
Morgan Chase, and Merrill Lynch.136  The “Big Four”137 account-
ing firms are located in New York, as well as 34 of the top 100 law
firms, and 17 of the top 40 management consulting firms.138  It is
also home to major distribution centers, such as Wal-Mart, Target,
Home Depot, Staples and Kohl’s.139  It has a gross state product of
approximately $800 billion a year, making the state one of the
world’s biggest economies.140
A state with such a vibrant economic life also has a considera-
ble number of private employees.  Yet, an examination of
whistleblower statutes of other states reveals that they often provide
greater protection to private employees than the New York
Whistleblower Statute provides.141  For example, the Minnesota
Whistleblower Statute provides that an employer shall not retaliate
against an employee who “in good faith, reports a violation or sus-
pected violation of any federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant
to law, to an employer or to any governmental body or law enforce-
ment official.”142  In New Hampshire, an employer is prohibited
from retaliating against an employee who “in good faith, reports
. . . what the employee has reasonable cause to believe is a violation of
any law or rule adopted under the laws of this state, a political sub-
division of this state, or the United States.”143  The New Jersey stat-
ute states that an employer shall not take any retaliatory action
135 Empire State Development, New York State Economy, at http://www.nylovesbiz.
com/NYS_Home_To_Business/nyseconomy.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
136 Empire State Development, Industry Clusters-Financial Services, at http://www.
nylovesbiz.com/NYS_Home_To_Business/Industry_Clusters/financial_services.asp
(last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
137 The “Big Four” used to be the “Big Five” accounting firms until 2002 when
“Chicago-based Arthur Andersen collapsed amid allegations of criminal wrongdoing
in its role as auditor of scandal-ridden Enron Corp. and other firms.”  Thomas S.
Mulligan, Big Four Top Accounting Watchdog’s List: Promising an Aggressive Stance, the
Oversight Board Created by Congressional Reforms Gets Down to Business, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2003, at Business Section 4.
138 Empire State Development, Industry Clusters-Business Services, at http://www.
nylovesbiz.com/NYS_Home_To_Business/Industry_Clusters/business_services.asp
(last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
139 Empire State Development, Industry Clusters-Distribution, at http://www.nyloves
biz.com/NYS_Home_To_Business/Industry_Clusters/distribution.asp (last visited
Feb. 21, 2004).
140 New York State Economy, supra note 135.
141 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5 (West 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52
(Anderson 2003); MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2
(1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3 (West 2003); see also Corbo, supra note 8, at 158-60.
142 MINN. STAT. § 181.932(1)(a) (emphasis added).
143 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:2(I)(a) (emphasis added).
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against an employee because the employee discloses, or threatens
to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or
practice of the employer that the employee reasonably believes is in
violation of a law, or a rule or regulation.144  California protects an
employee who discloses information to a government or law en-
forcement agency that the employee has reasonable cause to believe
involves a violation of state or federal statute or regulation.145
The Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey and California
statutes are significantly different from the New York statute.  The
employee does not have to show actual violation of the law; instead,
the employee only needs to have reasonable cause to believe there
is a violation and that she or he reports the violation in good
faith.146  In addition, the violation does not have to be one that
creates and presents a substantial and specific danger to the public
health or safety.  As long as the violation fails to comply with any
federal or state law or regulation, the employee is protected.
Even the Ohio statute, which offers less protection than those
from Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey and California, pro-
vides greater protection than the New York statute.  The Ohio stat-
ute states that an employee is protected if she or he discloses a
violation where “the employee reasonably believes that the violation
either is a criminal offense that is likely to cause an imminent risk
of physical harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety
or is a felony.”147  Like the Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey
and California statutes, an employee does not need to prove actual
violation, but only needs to show that she or he reasonably believes
that there is or has been a violation.  Unlike those statutes, in
which disclosure of any violation of law or regulation is protected,
Ohio only protects the disclosure of “a criminal offense that is
likely to cause an imminent risk of physical harm to persons or a
144 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-3(a).
145 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.5(b).
146 See Green v. Ralee Eng’g Co., 960 P.2d 1046, 1059 (Cal. 1998) (“[A]n employee
need not prove an actual violation of law; it suffices if the employer fired him for
reporting his reasonably based suspicions of illegal activity.”  (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196, 200 (Minn. 2000) (“While
there need not be an actual violation of law, the reported conduct must at least impli-
cate a violation of law.”); Appeal of Smithfield Dodge, Inc., 749 A.2d 318, 320 (N.H. 2000)
(The statute “does not require an actual violation of a law or rule but only that an
employee reasonably believe that such a violation has occurred.”); Estate of Roach v.
TRW, Inc., 754 A.2d 544, 552 (N.J. 2000) (The statute “does not require that the
activity complained of be an actual violation of a law or regulation, only that the
employee ‘reasonably believes’ that to be the case.”  (internal parentheses omitted)).
147 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4113.52(A)(1)(a) (2003) (emphasis added).
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hazard to public health or safety or is a felony.”148  Nonetheless,
the Ohio statute would surely have protected Lois Kern against dis-
charge for reporting an alleged sexual assault.149
VI. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE NEW YORK
WHISTLEBLOWER STATUTE
The New York Whistleblower Statute should be amended to
state: first, that an employee must show that she or he has a reason-
able belief that a violation of law, rule or regulation exists; and
second, that the violation of law, rule or regulation must cause
harm to the public welfare.
Thus, the amended Whistleblower Statute should read as
follows:
An employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel action
against an employee because such employee does any of the
following:
(a) discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a pub-
lic body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that
the employee reasonably believes is in violation of law, rule or
regulation that causes any harm to the public welfare;
(b) provides information to, or testifies before, any public body
conducting an investigation, hearing or inquiry into any
such violation of a law, rule or regulation by such employer
that causes any harm to the public welfare which the employee
reasonably believes is occurring or has occurred; or
(c) objects to, or refuses to participate in any such activity, pol-
icy or practice in violation of a law, rule or regulation that
causes any harm to the public welfare which the employee rea-
sonably believes is occurring or has occurred.
CONCLUSION
Whistleblowers are heroes who, at the very least, risk their live-
lihood to inform the government and/or the public of wrongful
acts by their employers.  These employees fully understand that
“[o]ur lives begin to end the day we become silent about things
that matter.”150  Their unquestionable value to society has been re-
inforced once again by the recent revelations of wrongful trading
148 Id.
149 See Kern v. DePaul Mental Health Servs., 139 Misc. 2d 970, 971 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1988), aff’d, 152 A.D.2d 957 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989), appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 615
(1989).
150 Lacayo & Ripley, supra note 1, at 27.
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practices in the mutual fund industry.151  Noreen Harrington, a
Wall Street executive, has joined Cynthia Cooper, Coleen Rowley,
and Sherron Watkins, to become the latest whistleblower by expos-
ing the “worst scandal in mutual funds since the Great Depres-
sion.”152  To effectively encourage private employees such as
Harrington and Cooper to disclose acts that are harmful to the
public welfare, the New York Whistleblower Statute must be
amended to guarantee protection to whistleblowers who disclose a
violation of law, rule or regulation that they reasonably believe
causes or has caused harm to the public welfare.  It is time for New
York to be not only the optimum location for corporate headquar-
ters, but also a state where private employees who volunteer as in-
formants for the government and the public receive well deserved
and desperately-needed protection.
151 Todd Wallack, Anatomy of a Scandal: Anonymous Tip Helped Mutual Fund Regula-
tors Find Where to Dig Up Bodies, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Dec. 23, 2003, at B1.
152 Id.

